Calm and Violent Passions:The Genealogy of a Distinction from Quintilian to Hume by Essary, Kirk & Haskell, Yasmin
                          Essary, K., & Haskell, Y. (2018). Calm and Violent Passions: The
Genealogy of a Distinction from Quintilian to Hume. Erudition and the
Republic of Letters, 3(1), 55-81. https://doi.org/10.1163/24055069-
00301003
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1163/24055069-00301003
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Brill at http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/24055069-00301003. Please refer to
any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the




Calm and Violent Passions: The Genealogy of a Distinction from Quintilian to Hume 
 
Abstract: While the distinction between the calm and violent passions has been treated by 
Hume scholars from a number of perspectives relevant to the Scottish philosopher’s thought 
more generally, little scholarly attention has been paid to this distinction either in the works of 
Hume’s non-English contemporaries (e.g., the French Jesuit Pierre Brumoy) or in the long 
rhetorical and literary tradition which often categorized the emotions as either calm or violent. 
This article examines the long history of the distinction between calm and violent, or mild and 
vehement, emotions from the classical Roman rhetorical tradition through the Renaissance and 
into the modern period. In doing so, it provides a partial but substantial genealogy of an 
important heuristic taxonomy in the history of emotions, while suggesting that the 
philosophical import of the distinction in the eighteenth century owes something to rhetorical 
and poetic traditions which are often not considered by historians of philosophy. 
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Historians and philosophers of emotion will be broadly familiar with the systems of the 
passions of Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche and Hume, but less so with that 
of Hume’s contemporary, French Jesuit poet and professor at the Collège Louis-le-Grand, 
Pierre Brumoy (1668-1742), whose twelve-book Latin poem “On the Passions” (De motibus 
animi) was published in the first and second tomes of his Recueïl de divers ouvrages en prose 
et en vers (Paris: Rollin, fils, 1741), but probably begun at least a decade before that.1 At the 
                                                     
1 See Yasmin Haskell, “Performing the Passions: Pierre Brumoy’s De motibus animi between Dramatic 
and Didactic Poetry”, forthcoming in Yasmin Haskell and Raphaële Garrod (eds.), Changing Hearts: 




heart of Brumoy’s poem are two books dividing the passions into the “milder” and “fiercer”. 
Brumoy’s sorting of the passions is sometimes surprising. For example, he classifies pride, 
shame, hardness of heart, tyranny in friendship, and even sexual jealousy among the “milder” 
passions. A different and more famous distinction between “calm” and “violent” passions was 
made, of course, by Brumoy’s contemporary, David Hume (1711-1776), in the second book of 
his Treatise of Human Nature (1739). It is likely that Hume was primarily influenced by 
Frances Hutcheson’s distinction between passions and calm affections in his “Essay on the 
Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections” (1728), although it is not impossible he 
caught sight of a draft of Brumoy’s poem when he sojourned in France in 1734-7.2 However 
that may be, the topic of calm or mild versus fierce or violent passions seems to have been in 
the air at this time, at least to judge by Hume’s declaration: “There is not in philosophy a 
subject of more nice speculation than this of the different causes and effects of the calm and 
violent passions” (THN 2.3.4).  
Elizabeth Radcliffe, in her 2015 review article of the scholarship on Hume’s passions, 
concedes that: “Hume’s taxonomy … offers some distinctions whose features are not always 
clear. His fundamental division between calm and violent passions is defined in terms of the 
internal upheaval with which a passion is felt: calm passions cause ‘no disorder in the soul’, are 
known by their effects, and are often mistaken for reason”.3 From the secondary literature we 
have surveyed we infer that most of the modern scholarship on Hume’s taxonomy of the 
passions has revolved around its internal consistency (or not); its connections with Hume’s 
ideas about reason, instinct, selfhood, love, happiness, and religion; and the relative originality 
of the calm/violent, strong/weak, direct/indirect distinctions (explained below). But while 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Kukkonen, “The Literary Designer Environments of Eighteenth-Century Jesuit Poetics”, forthcoming in 
The History of Distributed Cognition: Enlightenment and Romanticism. 
2 Alison Gopnik, “Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?”, in Hume Studies 35 (1/2) (2010): 
5-28. 
3 “Hume’s Psychology of the Passions: The Literature and Future Directions”, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, Volume 53, Number 4, October 2015, pp. 565-605, at 569. 
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Paxman and Immerwahr, for example, have highlighted the pervasive importance of the calm 
and violent passions for Hume’s thought,4 it would seem that little attention has been paid to 
the longer, often literary and rhetorical, backstory to this distinction. Radcliffe, for example, 
cites an older article by James Fieser, in which Hume’s passions are traced back to Stoic 
primitives, and suggests that the Stoics may be the “source of the distinction in both Hutcheson 
and Hume between calm and violent passions” insofar as they viewed passions as 
“perturbations causing emotional upheaval” (p. 570).5 But there is a quite rich—and as yet 
unstudied—tradition of distinguishing between the calm and violent passions in the Western 
rhetorical and literary tradition dating back at least to the Roman rhetorician Quintilian and 
running through to the early modern period. Like the rest of his system, Hume’s notion of the 
calm and violent passions was not born fully formed from the head of Jove, Chrysippus, let 
alone Hutcheson. This essay attempts to plot some of the classical and early modern stepping-
stones that may have led, via sometimes unconnected, sometimes converging, paths, to the 
taxonomic schemes of the calm versus violent passions we find in Hume and Brumoy.  
*** 
Church historian, poet and literary critic Pierre Brumoy, SJ, was professor of mathematics at 
the Collège Louis-le-Grand and editor of the Jesuit Mémoires de Trévoux. He is best known for 
his Théâtre des Grecs (Paris, 1730), a multi-volume translation of the works of Aeschylus, 
                                                     
4 Thus Katharina Paxman: “Though Hume spends relatively little time giving direct treatment to the 
distinction,  commentators have found it to play important roles in much of his writing. John Immerwahr 
[“Tranquillizing the Passions”, Hume Studies 18.2 (1992): 293-314] has argued that many of Hume’s 
investigations on topics including morality, happiness, religion, and politics are informed by his 
distinction between calm and violent passions” (“Imperceptible Impressions and Disorder in the Soul: A 
Characterization of the Distinction between Calm and Violent Passions in Hume”, Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 13.3 (2015): 265–278. 




Sophocles and Euripides, translated into English by Charlotte Lennox in 1759 (The Greek 
Theatre was certainly known to Hume). It is not possible here to review in detail the system of 
the passions Brumoy elaborates in his long Latin poem on the passions, De motibus animi. The 
section that concerns us for the purposes of this essay begins in the eighth book, where Brumoy 
reminds us that he has, thus far, treated the “father and the three principal passions” (viz. love, 
happiness, suffering, and desire),6
 
and that it is now time to descend to the “general populace”. 
There follows a census of two tribes of passions, the “milder”/ “sweet” (“mansuetiores”/ 
“douces”) and the “fiercer”/ “violent” (“ferociores”/ “violentes”).7 These are rendered as 
allegorical, indeed dramatic, figures in the course of Brumoy’s eighth and ninth books. On the 
mild side we find hope (“spes”), confidence (“fiducia”), pride (“superbia”), flattery 
(“adulatio”), haughtiness (“fastidium”), hardness of heart (“inclementia”), reverence 
(“veneratio”), despondency (“abjectio animi”), shame (“pudor”), compassion (“commiseratio”), 
favour (“favor”), gratitude (“gratia”), laziness (“segnities”),
 
indulgence/ forbearance 
(“indulgentia”),  indignation/ judgmentalism (“indignatio”), tyranny in friendship (“tyrannis in 
amicitia”), and, most surprisingly, sexual suspicion/ jealousy (“diffidentia in amore”). The 
violent passions include hatred (“odium”), betrayal (“proditio”), calumny (“calumnia”), envy 
(“invidia”), anger (“anger”), rage (“furor”), boldness (“audacia”), cowardice (“ignavia”), fear  
(“timor”), remorse (“conscientiarum stimuli”), and despair (“desperatio”). 
Brumoy’s “milder” and “fiercer” passions are, on the face of it, different in kind from 
Hume’s “calm” and “violent”. In THN 2.1.1 Hume first makes a rough division between 
original and reflective impressions: “Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and 
all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling 
                                                     
6 In the fourth book Brumoy had asserted that from “Love” spring the three principal passions of 
“Happiness, Suffering and Desire” (“la Joïe, la Douleur & le Désir”), coincidentally the same three 
proposed by Spinoza in his Ethics! While we proceed directly from “Happiness” (book 4) to “Sadness 
and Suffering” (book 5), the sixth book, “Laughter and Tears”, seems to be an intermission before the 
seventh, “Longing and Desires”. 
7 The French calques from the Latin comparatives are Brumoy’s own. 
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them.”8 The following paragraph is key: 
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. 
Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external 
objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and 
humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music 
frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called 
passions,9 may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible.  
In THN 2.3.3 Hume explains that when such passions are “calm, and cause no disorder in the 
soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason” and that “[w]hat we call 
strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”. In THN 2.3.4, 
he sheds further light on how a calm or “imperceptible” passion might function, and further 
distinguishes between a calm and weak, a violent and a strong: 
’Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the 
disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once 
become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it 
commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own 
force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that 
opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. We 
must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a 
strong one. (emphasis ours) 
Here Hume seems to conceive a calm passion almost as a disposition or habit that flies under 
                                                     
8 We cite the original edition from http://www.davidhume.org/texts/thn.html. 
9 In this context Hume further divides the passions (proper) into direct and indirect, the first arising 
“immediately from good or evil, pain or pleasure”, the second “such as proceed from the same principles, 
but by the conjunction of other qualities. This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. 
I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, 
vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct passions, 
desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security.” According to Jane McIntyre, this distinction 
between direct and indirect passions is entirely original to Hume: “Hume’s Passions: Direct and 
Indirect,” Hume Studies 26 (2000) 77-86, at 78. 
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the radar of our awareness. Yet it is not necessarily weak, because it affects our will and can 
even “control [the violent passions] in their most furious movements” (THN 2.3.8). 
Nevertheless, Hume suggests that if we wish to influence a person (and here he follows a long 
rhetorical tradition going back at least to Quintilian), “’twill commonly be better policy to work 
upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what is 
vulgarly called his reason” (THN 2.3.4).  
To summarize, while both calm and violent passions influence the will, the violent (i.e. 
passions proper) are usually more potent. Hume says that both pursue good and avoid evil, and 
both are increased or reduced by the relative increase or diminution of good or evil. The 
relative proximity of the object of the passion determines its “violence”: “The same good, 
when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one” (THN 
2.3.4). In THN 2.3.8, Hume concludes that: 
Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and 
depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual. 
… What makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm passion may easily be 
changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and 
situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by 
custom, or by exciting the imagination. 
Of course, as we saw in our first quotation, Hume also allows that a violent passion can 
“decay” into a “soft” emotion. 
Hume’s account is telegraphic but does indeed seem to be inspired by Hutcheson’s 
distinction between the calm (benevolent) affections and the particular (affections and) 
passions. The relevant passage demands to be quoted in extenso: 
There is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between the calm Desire of Good, 
and Aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as it appears to our Reason or Reflection; 
and the particular Passions towards Objects immediately presented to some Sense. Thus 
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nothing can be more distinct than the general calm Desire of private Good of any kind, 
which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the 
Means of Good, and the particular selfish Passions, such as Ambition, Covetousness, 
Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger, as they arise upon particular Occasions. In like manner, 
our publick Desires may be distinguished into the general calm Desire of the Happiness 
of others, or Aversion to their Misery upon Reflection; and the particular Affections or 
Passions of Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection. These particular 
Affections are found in many Tempers, where, thro’ want of Reflection, the general calm 
Desires are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are 
found in same Temper. We obtain Command over the particular Passions, principally by 
strengthening the general Desires thro frequent Reflection, and making them habitual, so 
as to obtain Strength superior to the particular Passions.10 
Unlike Brumoy, Hume does not sort the passions proper (love, anger, pride, envy…) into 
separate categories of calm/mild and violent/vehement, but seems to envisage them existing on 
a continuum with the calm, reflective impressions. That is, the same emotions are “calm” to the 
extent than they are less perceptible, apparently more aligned with reason, “violent” to the 
extent that they are more intrusive, intense, and compelling.  
 
*** 
Whatever the proximate influences may be for Hume’s account, each of these eighteenth-
century thinkers is in fact participating in a long tradition of distinguishing between calm and 
                                                     
10 “Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the 
Passions, with their final Cause”, from An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and 





violent emotions, or between calmness and violence within affective states.11 While we are 
unable here to deal with the instances of this distinction in all the various disciplinary contexts 
where it may be manifest in the western intellectual tradition, a preliminary examination of the 
distinction as it appears in the rhetorical tradition, which at times converges with philosophical 
discussions as well, will illuminate the ways in which it was long important as a way of 
classifying affective states.12 Moreover, while many writers discuss violence or vehemence 
with respect to the emotions, which might imply that they understand them on a scale of 
calmness and violence, we are only here attending to those authors that we are aware of who 
make an explicit categorical distinction between calm and violent or mild and vehement 
emotion.13 Finally, while we do not doubt that modern thinkers like Hume are indebted 
(directly or indirectly) to the rhetorical, and indeed poetic and dramatic, traditions in this 
regard, our main purpose here is not to establish such dependence, but rather to provide a 
partial genealogical account from antiquity to the modern period that will be useful for 
historians of emotion in its own right. We hope that such an account demonstrates the 
usefulness of the history of emotions broadly in the history of scholarship, and that 
interdisciplinary approaches are fundamentally important for intellectual history.  
 
                                                     
11 We use the term “emotions” occasionally here aware of the risks of anachronism, but also out of 
convenience on the understanding that there is very little consistency in the employment of emotion 
terms in the long history from Quintilian to Hume, irrespective of the language under consideration. See 
further Kirk Essary, “Passions, Emotions, or Affections? On the Ambiguity of Sixteenth-Century 
Terminology,” in Emotion Review (2017) 1-8. 
12 We must defer to a future occasion(s) the investigation of medical and ethnographic literature, in which 
calm and violent passions were sometimes assigned to different genders, ages, temperaments, nations, 
and occupations; of religious texts, e.g. preaching manuals and discussions of Christ’s experience of 
human passions; and of the fortunes of the calm and violent/ weaker/stronger passions in early modern 
and eighteenth-century dramatic and aesthetic theory, e.g. with reference to genre decorum and in the 
context of the sublime.  
13 The distinction has various similar and related taxonomies, for example the Stoic invocation of 
eupatheiai as conducive to constantia versus the passionate overthrowing of reason, or the influential 
Thomist division of the lower part of the souls faculties into concupiscible and irascible appetites. 
Neither of these, however, can be perfectly mapped onto the calm/violent distinction. On Stoic 
eupatheiai and a partial look at its legacy into the medieval period, see Peter King, “Dispassionate 
Passions,” in Emotion & Cognitive Life in Medieval & Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Martin Pickave 
and Lisa Shapiro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9-31. On Aquinas on the passions, see e.g. 
Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge, 2009). 
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Calm and Violent Emotion in Roman Antiquity 
Early explicit formulations of the distinction between the calm and violent passions are to be 
found in the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian. In his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero 
makes a distinction relevant to our overall scheme in his exposition of the matter in Greek 
philosophy: “Now, what the Greeks call the pathe, I prefer to translate as ‘emotions,’ rather than 
‘sicknesses.’ In treating of these emotions, I shall preserve the familiar distinction made long 
ago by Pythagoras and later by Plato. They make a division of the mind into two parts, one of 
which has a share in reason, while the other does not. In the part which has a share in reason 
they put tranquility (that is, a calm and quiet consistency); in the other, the turbulent motions of 
anger and desire, which are opposed to reason and inimical to it.”14 Here, then, we find the 
rather common ancient notion that the passions in general are problematic especially insofar as 
they impinge upon reason, which latter functions best in situations of tranquillitas. This tradition 
forms the backdrop of the majority of prominent western discussions of calmness and violence 
with respect to reason and the passions until the modern period. Note, however, that Cicero’s 
distinction, while relevant, is not precisely between two types of emotion, but between two 
psychological faculties. It would seem that we have to wait for Quintilian for a clear and proper 
categorical distinction between the calm and violent emotions.15 Moreover, while Cicero is 
simultaneously expositing the Stoics, Platonists, Pythagoreans, and Epicureans (in invoking 
tranquillitas as a psychological ideal), Quintilian—though to some extent indebted to Cicero 
himself—takes his departure point on our subject from Aristotle.  
                                                     
14 Tusc. Disp. IV.10; quoted in Margaret Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 
(University of Chicago Press, 2009), 43. 
15 There is something of a debate about the matter of identifying ethos with the milder passions in Cicero. 
Solmsen (1941, 179) argues that ethos is a kind of gentle affection for Cicero, while Wisse (1989, 240-
41) demurs. Perhaps George Kennedy puts it best in suggesting that Cicero “regards ethos as consisting 
in presentation of the gentler emotions” (1972, 222). This would seem to be different from identifying it 
as a type or class of emotion. For a full discussion, see the recent doctoral thesis by Javier Gomez Gil, 
“La Retorica del Vir Bonus: El Ethos del Orador y Los Lenes Adfectus en el De Oratore de Ciceron” 




In Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, the distinction between the calm and violent emotions 
is subsumed under a broader division, taken from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, between ethos and 
pathos. While the rhetorical force of the distinction does not carry all the same valences as, say, 
Hume’s philosophical discussion of it, we see that there are a number of relevant attendant 
issues that originated in these earlier works and which may have percolated up to Hume. 
Quintilian’s discussion of ethos and pathos in the Institutio Oratoria is in part concerned with 
the rhetorical tactics that stem ultimately from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, namely defining ethos as it 
relates to “character,” and pathos as it relates to the emotions.16 However, Quintilian also writes 
that ethe are types of emotion as well, and not only rough equivalents of Aristotelian hexeis (or 
habitus in Quintilian’s Latin).17 It is the affective valence of ethos that we are concerned with 
here, as this is for our purposes the salient feature which sets Quintilian’s account apart from 
Aristotle’s, and which will come to have direct influence in Renaissance discussions of the calm 
and violent passions. Quintilian writes in Book VI: 
Emotions however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is 
called pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by adfectus: 
the other is called ethos, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent: it is 
however rendered by mores and consequently the branch of philosophy known 
as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us. But close consideration of the nature of the 
                                                     
16 For the distinction in Aristotle, see Rhetoric II, xii-xvii on ethe; and II i-xi on pathe. Ethos can be 
determinative of pathos in Aristotle, as for example in the case of young men who by nature have strong 
passions (see II, xii). Aristotle does discuss the difference between calmness and anger, friendliness and 
enmity, shame and shamelessness (etc.) at II, ii, 3-6, and this discussion is relevant for our longer story. 
Indeed, the notion of calm passions as virtuous is a fundamental tenet of Aristotle’s ethics of emotion, 
and this would come to have substantial influence on the history of the philosophy of emotion, especially 
as an alternative to more rigid forms of Stoicism.  
17 For a distinction between habitus and affectio in Cicero, see De Inventione I.25, and for his discussion 
of ethe and pathe, see De Oratore 37.128. On gentle and vehement styles, and their relationship to the 
emotions, see De Orat. 38-44.216. For Aristotle’s discussion of the distinction between pathos and hexis, 
see Nic. Eth. 1105b19-1106a13. 
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subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is 
meant as certain peculiar aspects; for the term morals includes every habit of the mind.18  
Quintilian thus wishes to narrow down ethos so that it more properly covers a type (in Latin, 
species) of affectus rather than having it include every mental habitus. He goes on to suggest 
that mores is in this way too broad a term, for it has a semantic range that expands far beyond 
the emotional, and he then draws a distinction between the calm and violent passions:  
The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to 
translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent 
emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the 
passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter 
persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill. Some add that ethos is continuous, 
while pathos is momentary.19 
Thus we have here a clear distinction between the “calm” (lenes) emotions and the 
“vehement/violent” (vehementes) ones. Quintilian further suggests that ethos and pathos are 
“sometimes of the same nature, differing only in degree,” as in the case of caritas and amor (the 
former falling under the category of ethos, the latter pathos).20 Examples of ethos along these 
lines are exhibited in the relationship of a father to his son, a guardian to his ward, and the 
moderatio displayed by a husband to his wife (all are examples of caritas).21 Love (amor) for 
                                                     
18 Inst. VI.2.8-9 (trans. Butler, modified; emphasis in original): Horum autem, sicut antiquitus traditum 
accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci pathos vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum 
dicimus, alteram ethos, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus: mores appellantur, 
atque inde pars quoque illa philosophiae ethike moralis est dicta. Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi 
non tam mores significari videntur quam morum quaedam proprietas; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus 
mentis continetur. 
19 Inst. VI.2.9-10: Cautiores voluntatem complecti quam nomina interpretari maluerunt. Adfectus igitur 
hos concitatos, illos mites atque compositos esse dixerunt: in altero vehementes motus, in altero lenes, 
denique hos imperare, illos persuadere, hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere. X. 
Adiciunt quidam ethos perpetuum, pathos temporale esse. 
20 Inst. VI.2.12: Quin illud adhuc adicio, pathos atque ethos esse interim ex eadem natura, ita ut illud 
maius sit, hoc minus, ut amor pathos, caritas ethos 
21 Inst. VI.2.14: Sed tamen alia patris adversus filium, tutoris adversus pupillum, mariti adversus uxorem 




friends falls somewhere in the middle, it being stronger than ethos but weaker than pathos.22 
Ethos is not only gentle and calm (mite ac placidum), but also incites pleasure and delight 
(amabile atque iucundum). 
 Pathos is less subtle than ethos in Quintilian’s scheme. Pathos relates to the so-called 
basic emotions, “almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred, and pity.”23 The 
most apt way to compare the two, for Quintilian, is by invoking the difference between comedy 
and tragedy.24 The task of the orator in moving these emotions is “not merely to slew the bitter 
and grievous nature of ills that actually are so, but also to make ills which are usually regarded 
as tolerable seem unendurable, as for instance when we represent insulting words as inflicting 
more grievous injury than an actual blow or represent disgrace as being worse than death.”25 
While ethos is employed by the orator in typically calm and even light-hearted situations (it is 
the province of irony, for example, Quintilian says), pathos pertains to situations where the 
audience needs to be more violently and perhaps only temporarily stirred. In many ways 
Quintilian is simply following Cicero here from De Oratore (37.128 and 43.212, e.g.), who 
distinguishes the ethikon from the pathetikon as delightful and violent respectively. Indeed, even 
though Cicero does not quite seem to identify ethe with the gentle emotions, it is important to 
note that he does make a distinction between the milder and more vehement modes in the 
context of his discussion of ethos and pathos, and between gentle and vehement style in the De 
Oratore, and this could certainly have influenced Quintilian’s account.26 (Indeed, Nicolas 
                                                                                                                                                                          
eos faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur), alia cum senex adulescentis alieni convicium, honestus 
inferioris fert; hic enim tantum concitari, illic etiam adfici debet. 
22 Inst. VI.2.17. 
23 Inst. VI.2.20: Haec pars circa iram odium metum invidiam miserationem fere tota versatur 
24 Inst. VI.2.20: Diversum est huic quod pathos dicitur quodque nos adfectum proprie vocamus, et, ut 
proxime utriusque differentiam signem, illud comoediae, hoc tragoediae magis simile. 
25 Inst. VI.2.23: Interim notasse contentus sum non id solum agere adfectus, ut quae sunt ostendantur 
acerba ac luctuosa, sed etiam ut quae toleranda haberi solent gravia videantur, ut cum in maledicto plus 
iniuriae quam in manu, in infamia plus poenae dicimus quam in morte. 
26 Orat. 37.128, for example, reads: Duo restant enim, quae bene tractata ab oratore admirabilem 
eloquentiam faciunt. Quorum alterum est, quod Graeci ethikon vocant, ad naturas et ad mores et ad 
omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum; alterum, quod idem pathetikon nominant, quo perturbantur 




Caussin, the 17th-century French Jesuit, attributes the distinction to Cicero, not Quintilian.27) But 
Quintilian’s overt and clear description of ethe as a type of affectus distinguishes him from his 
predecessors (both Cicero and Aristotle), and this distinction finds its way into Renaissance 
conceptions of emotion.28  
 
Calm and Violent Emotion in Renaissance Rhetoric 
Quintilian’s influence through the Middle Ages is still rather unclear, but we do know that 
manuscript versions of his works (at least ten editions, not all complete) circulated to some 
extent.29 A complete eleventh-century manuscript of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria was 
discovered in 1416 by Poggio Bracciolini at the monastery of St. Gallen, and this would 
eventually give rise to widespread appreciation of him in the Renaissance.30 According to Nancy 
van Deusen, at least thirty printed editions came off the press from 1470 to 1591.31 In the 
sixteenth century the reception of Quintilian is thus more readily discernible (and often quite 
explicit), and the distinction he makes between the mild and violent emotions makes its way into 
rhetorical handbooks, preaching manuals, and treatises on the soul in this period. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
conciliandam paratum; hoc vehemens incensum incitatum, quo causae eripiuntur: quod cum rapide 
fertur, sustineri nullo pacto potest. 
27 Alii motus sunt leniores, quos ethikois Cicero nominat; alii vehementiores, qui pathetikoi appelantur; 
Et si recta rationem excedant, animae oikonomian, adversis veluti ventis labefactant, et divellunt (De 
eloquentia VIII.2, Paris 1630, fol. 460). 
28 Lorenzo Casini also points this out in his essay on Vives; see “Emotions in Renaissance Humanism,” 
in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes (ed. Lagerlund and Yrjonsuri; Kluwer, 2002), 212.  
29 On the medieval manuscript tradition and early incunabula printing tradition of the Institutio Oratoria, 
see Nancy van Deusen, Cicero Refused to Die: Ciceronian Influence through the Centuries (Brill, 2013), 
47-48. On Quintilian’s influence on medieval and Renaissance rhetoric, see John O. Ward, “Quintilian 
and the Rhetorical Revolution of the Middle Ages,” in Rhetorica 13:3 (1995), 231-284, and idem. 
“Cicero and Quintilian,” in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, III: The Renaissance 
(Cambridge, 1999), 77-87. Also see John Monfasani, “Episodes of Anti-Quintilianism in the Italian 
Renaissance: Quarrels on the Orator as a Vir Bonus and Rhetoric as the Scientia Bene Dicendi,” in 
Rhetorica 10:2 (1992), 119-138. 
30 See van Deusen, 48n2. 
31 Cicero Refused to Die, 47. 
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Erasmus of Rotterdam, perhaps the most prominent popularizer of Quintilian’s rhetorical 
ideas, takes up Quintilian’s distinction between the calm and vehement passions and elaborates 
on it in his own way on multiple occasions. In his rhetorical handbook, De Copia (1512), a work 
widely and often printed and translated, he writes: “The more violent emotions, which the 
Greeks call pathe are to be discovered in Homer’s Iliad and in tragedy; the calmer ones, which 
are pleasant rather than disturbing, are supplied by Homer’s Odyssey and by comedy. Yet ethe, 
which is what the Greeks call the emotions of comedy, are often interspersed in the Iliad and 
Greek tragedy. Latin tragedy makes rather sparing use of them.”32 Erasmus goes on, in the 
Copia, to give examples from Homer, Horace, and Cicero of pleasant and delightful emotions. A 
particularly pleasing scene, according to Erasmus, comes in the Iliad where Andromache runs to 
meet Hector who is leaving for battle: the plume on Hector’s helmet frightens their child, which 
results in laughter and simultaneously in Andromache “smiling through her tears.” The scene for 
Erasmus elicits immense pleasure, and is also an instance of “mixed emotion,” given 
Andromache’s laughter at the reaction of the child and her tears at her husband’s departing for 
battle.33  
In the Ecclesiastes sive de ratione concionandi (1535), an enormous manual for 
preachers and his last major work, Erasmus expands his discussion of the distinction and in fact 
reverses Quintilian’s explanation of the Latin terminology:  
It is generally agreed that there are two kinds of emotions, one gentler and more like 
those of comedy, the other more powerful and tragic, and nothing forbids positing a 
middle ground between these, as I see Quintilian did. The Greeks call the former ethe, 
the Latins mores. The Greeks call the latter pathe; since the Latins did not devise a 
                                                     
32 CWE 24, 654. Erasmus makes the same distinction, with reference to Quintilian, in the adage 
Tragicum Malum (Adag. IV iii 40; see LB II 1014C, and CWE 36:27), in the Ratio Verae Theologiae 
(Holborn, 187), and in the Ecclesiastes as discussed below. See also the De Ratione Studii (CWE 
24:687f.) where Erasmus discusses characters from Terence’s comedies in relation to this distinction. 
33 In the Panegyricus, Erasmus describes Andromache’s tears as a sign of “grief’s laughter,” and further 
glosses it as an instance of sardonic laughter (CWE 24, 654-55), which latter itself constitutes a lengthy 
entry in his Adages (III v 1 in CWE 35:63). 
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specific word for them, some misuse the name of a genus for a species and call them 
‘emotions,’ others ‘perturbations’ or ‘movements of the soul,’ others ‘desires,’ others 
‘diseases.’ Yet neither ethos in Greek nor mores in Latin strictly speaking denotes what 
we mean here, inasmuch as ethe in Greek are the mores on the basis of which we are said 
to be, and are, good or bad; but that word has been distorted both by them and by us for 
didactic purposes, so that it signifies the common and more moderate emotions by which 
everyone is affected because they are natural and that are recognized by everyone and 
cause delight rather than disturbance.34 
Erasmus is aware that Quintilian and others are technically taking liberties in describing ethos as 
a kind of emotion, but finds the distinction useful nonetheless for distinguishing emotions which 
delight (delectent) from those which disturb (perturbent), the same functional distinction 
Quintilian had made earlier. Erasmus gives a series of examples, as Quintilian had, of calm 
emotions and related “ethical” dispositions: love of parents for their children and “the greater 
severity of uncles towards their nephews” are types of gentle affections, while more properly 
related to ethos qua character would be vanity in females, cruelty in males, “in soldiers lavish 
spending and boasting,” “in an Italian politeness and learning, in a German zeal for war,” and so 
on.35 The latter sort of ethe are closely related to what Erasmus elsewhere in this work calls 
“temperaments” (natura animi and habitus animi), which he distinguishes from emotion 
                                                     
34 CWE 68:792, modified; ASD V-5, 68: Constat autem imprimis duplex esse affectuum genus, alterum 
mitius et quasi comicum, alterum vehementius ac tragicum. Nec quicquam vetat inter hos collocare 
medium, quod a Fabio factum video. Prius illud Graeci vocant ethe, Latini mores. Posterius hoc Graeci 
pathe vocant, Latini quoniam propriam vocem non inveniunt, alii generali nomine abutentes pro specie 
vocant ‘affectus’, alii ‘perturbationes’ aut ‘motus animorum’, alii cupiditates’, alii ‘morbos’. Quanquam 
nec ethos Graecis, nec mores Latinis hoc proprie sonant, quod hic sentimus. Siquidem ethe Graecis 
mores sunt, a quibus boni malive dicimur et sumus. Sed ea vox ut illis ita et nobis deflexa est docendi 
gratia, ut declaret affectus communes ac moderatiores, quibus nemo non afficitur, quod sint secundum 
naturam et ab omnibus agnoscantur ac delectent verius quam perturbent. 
35 See CWE 68:792-93. For an interesting later example of such ethnic affective profiling, see the Icon 
animorum of the Scottish Latin novelist and satirist, John Barclay (1582-1621). The Scots, e.g., are prone 
to anger but their rage is quickly mitigated (4. 23); the Italians’ “hatred … will outlast an age and – 
which is the most mischievous – their minds are never so easy wounded as obstinate in bearing the 
lasting scar” (6.8) (transl. Mark Riley, Icon Animorum or The Mirror of Minds (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2013)). 
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(commotio) in that temperament is constant while emotion is temporary, “so that anger is the 
emotion, irascibility the temperament, and fear is the emotion, fearfulness the temperament.”36 It 
should, perhaps, be mentioned that this sort of distinction is not alien to Hume's account, for he 
counts things like “natural instincts of benevolence” and “kindness to children” in his category 
of the calm passions.37 
Earlier in the Ecclesiastes, Erasmus had written that Livy and Virgil are apt at treating 
the gentler emotions, and that the Roman tragedians were more forceful than the Greeks in 
treating the more violent ones.38 Here, as elsewhere, Erasmus locates the common use of the 
gentler emotions in comedy, which he says ultimately derives from Homer’s Odyssey and which 
itself contains an abundance of such references, but he also finds this use of emotion in, for 
example, the parable of the prodigal son in Luke 15 (“indeed, a comedy of some elegance could 
be woven from it”).39 Erasmus then points to Quintilian’s distinction between caritas and amor 
as useful for distinguishing ethe from pathe. And as examples of “the sort of violent passion that 
tortures us and deprives us of judgment and peace of mind,” which is a gloss on pathos, he gives 
Phaedra’s love for Hippolytus, Medea’s of Jason, and Dido’s towards Aeneas. “The principal 
emotions of this kind,” he writes, “are pity, indignation, love, and hate.”40 None of these 
emotions, moreover, to Erasmus’ way of thinking, is necessarily worse than any other, but it 
rather depends upon circumstance. Hatred, for example, may be kindled in the congregation by 
                                                     
36 CWE 78:616; ASD V-4, 372. 
37 See T 2.3.3.8, and Radcliffe, "Hume's Psychology of the Passions," 569 and 588. 
38 CWE 68:490; ASD V-4, 265: Idem [i.e., Livy] in mitioribus affectibus, quos Graeci vocant mores, 
iucundus est, quemadmodum et Virgilius. Acriores affectus petuntur a tragicis, quanquam Latini, qui 
quidem extant, plus hic habent vehementiae quam Graeci. 
39 CWE 68:793. 
40 CWE 68:794; ASD V-5, 72: amorem inter pathe, qua voce putat declarari vehementem affectum, qui 
nos discruciet ac iudicium mentisque tranquillitatem eripiat, qualem fingunt Phaedrae in Hippolytum, 
Medeae in Iasonem, Didonis in Aeneam... Huius generis affectus praecipui sunt misericordia, indignatio, 
amor, et odium. 
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the preacher, but against vice and not against another person. Meanwhile caritas Christianae is 
to be inflamed in every possible way.41  
Erasmus recognizes that certain rhetorical tactics, like the use of vivid narration or 
hypotyposis, are better for eliciting strong emotions than others. That said, in the context of the 
preacher’s duty to teach Christian virtue, he is more effective if he avoids emotions which are 
temporarily vehement: the preacher is to move not the “temporary emotions which cool 
quickly,” but the longer-lasting emotions that lead to piety.42 We would seem to be justified in 
mapping this onto the distinction between the vehement and mild passions, given what Erasmus 
says later: 
Secular rhetoricians have also wisely perceived that one should not dwell too long on 
those violent emotions that shake a person completely but should descend from them 
gradually to more moderate ones, just as one ought not to rush into them suddenly; for 
nature does not allow anything that is exceptional to continue for long. It is not even 
expedient to stir up the feelings of one’s hearers frequently and immoderately, for, just as 
the body is hardened by constant blows, as happens to slaves, so the mind may be 
hardened from excessively frequent and bitter displays of emotionalism.43 
In this case Erasmus provides a prescriptive account of the violent or sharp (acer) emotions, 
which are identified with short-lived passions, and which ought to give way to the more 
moderate (moderatiores) passions in sacred oratory. Erasmus has thus taken Quintilian’s 
distinction and adapted it to the rhetorical context of the Christian sermon, and authors of other 
early modern sacred rhetorics, both Protestant and Catholic, would follow suit.  
                                                     
41 ASD V-5, 80. 
42 See, e.g., CWE 68:806. 
43 CWE 68:811; ASD V-5, 92: Illud etiam huius mundi rhetores sapienter perspexerunt, acribus illis 
affectibus, qui totum hominem concutiunt, non esse diutius immorandum, sed quemadmodum non 
oportet ad illos subito prorumpere, ita sensim ab illis ad moderatiores descendendum. Nec enim natura 
fert, ut quae summa sunt, sint diutina. Ne expedit quidem frequenter et immodice concitare animos 
auditorum, ne quemadmodum ad assidua verbera corpus serviliter obdurescit, ita mens nimium acribus, 
nimiumque crebris commotionibus obrigescat. 
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 Andreas Hyperius, for example, who published his De formandis concionibus sacris first 
in 1553, writes that the vehement and mild emotions should be roused by the preacher at 
different times, depending on the rhetorical circumstance.44 Like Erasmus, however (and 
probably following him), Hyperius argues that the vehement affections should not be 
encouraged for too long, but that the preacher should assiduously rouse the gentler emotions. As 
the 1577 English translation renders Hyperius: 
Furthermore, where the Orators bee of opinion that it is not good to sticke longe, 
especially in the affections that are ouer vehemente, in that pointe wee also assente vnto 
them: seeinge the thinges that are ouer vehement can in no wise bee of any longe 
continuance. But as for the gentiller sort of affections, to disperse them through euery 
parte of the Sermon, it is very seemely and profitable for the Oration yt always creepeth 
lowe by the ground and neuer at any time mounteth vup by a lofte or waxeth hote, it is 
very lyke that such a one will bringe tediousness & bee disliked of the hearers.45 
In sacred rhetoric, the distinction between the vehement and calm passions comes to have 
important significance for the ways in which the preacher might best persuade the congregation 
and encourage them to virtue. Lingering too long on tactics that move violently may have short-
term gain but not the desired lasting effects. 
 
The Distinction in Early Modern Treatises on the Passions 
                                                     
44 De formandis concionibus (Basel, 1563), fol. 95: Itaque hunc ipsum scies ita tibi explicandum, ut 
affectus commovere seu vehementiores seu mitiores, quantum expedire videris, studeas. 
45 De formandis concionibus (Basel, 1563), fol. 113: Quod oratores praeterea censuerunt adfectibus, 
praesertim vehementioribus, non esse diu inhaerendum, in eo nos ipsis assentimur: quando diuturna esse 
nullo possunt modo, quae sunt vehementia. Mitiores autem adfectus per singulas misceri concionum 
partes cumprimis decorum atque utile est. Quae namque oratio semper repit, neque usquam assurgit vel 
incalescit, eam verosimile est taedium adferre, atque improbari ab auditoribus. 
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The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a proliferation of treatises on the passions or 
treatments of the passions within treatises on the soul in several European languages, and in 
these works we find a shift from a properly rhetorical context to a more recognizably 
“psychological” (whether theological, generally moral, or medical) one in analyses of the 
emotions.46 And yet the distinction between the calm and violent passions continues to play an 
important role in the categorization of and deliberation on the significance of affectivity, and 
many of the features of the rhetorical tradition are carried over into these treatises as well.  
Outside the context of sacred rhetoric, but still falling on the trajectory of Quintilian’s 
distinction, for example, is the influential treatise, De anima et vita, by Spanish humanist Juan 
Luis Vives, first published in 1538. Vives, an early devotee and long time colleague of Erasmus, 
may be the first thinker to take Quintilian’s distinction out of a rhetorical context and integrate it 
into a treatise on the passions.47 Invoking a common metaphor from the period, Vives compares 
the vehement and gentle passions to violent and calm seas: 
Just as in the motions of the sea one motion is a soft breeze, one stronger, and another 
vehement as a horrible tempest that stirs up the whole sea from the depths together with 
the sand and the fishes; so in the motions of the soul some are light, so that you might 
almost call them beginnings of a rising motion, some more intense, and others shake up 
the whole soul and drive it away from the seat of reason and state of judgment. These are 
real disturbances and unrestrained motions, since now the soul is practically not in 
control of itself, but becomes subject to an alien power, blinded and unable to see 
anything. The former you might rightly call emotions, while the latter are the 
                                                     
46 For an overview of treatises on the emotions in this period, see the still quite helpful Harry Gardiner, 
Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories (New York: American Book Company, 1937). 
47 For background on the eventually fraught relationship between Vives and Erasmus, see Carlos Norena, 




commotions and agitations that the Greeks call pathe, i.e., passions, since the whole soul 
suffers this blow and becomes agitated.48  
One often salient feature of the violent passions is that they overwhelm the entire person and, 
most problematically for many thinkers, that they overwhelm reason (as we see is hinted at by 
Hume later on). We saw Erasmus above describe the sharper emotions as “violently shaking the 
whole person” (concutiunt totum hominem). Here Vives uses the same verb to describe the 
tempestuous movements that shake up the whole soul (concutiunt universum animum) and 
unhinge reason. In the long history of rhetorical theory this may be either a good or a bad thing, 
depending on the orator’s audience and purposes, but by and large it is something to be avoided 
in the heritage of the western philosophical traditions. Vives here teases out the etymology of 
the Greek pathe, suggesting that the more violent emotions might better be labelled passiones 
because the entire soul suffers (patitur) when it experiences them. He also seems to toy with the 
idea of equating the calmer (leves) emotions—note that he doesn’t actually refer to the Greek 
term ethe—with what the Stoics called “propassions” (propassiones, propatheiai): in Vives’ 
words they are the beginnings of a rising movement (initia surgentis motus) in the soul.49 
Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), the Lutheran humanist and theologian, also makes the 
distinction between ethe and pathe in his Elementa rhetorices of 1519 and again in his 1552 
Liber de anima. In the first work, he reproduces Quintilian’s distinction (no doubt he had also 
read Erasmus’ De copia), distinguishing between ethe as affectus leniores and pathe as affectus 
                                                     
48 Trans. Lorenzo Casini (in “Emotions in Renaissance Humanism”): At vero, quemadmodum in maris 
motibus est alius aurae tenuis, alius concitatior, alius vehemens, quique horrida tempestate mare omne a 
fundo verrat cum arena ipsa et piscibus: sic in his animorum agitationibus quaedam sunt leves, quas velut 
initia quaedam dixeris surgentis motus: aliae sunt validiores, aliae animum universum concutiunt, deque 
rationis sede ac statu iudicii depellunt, quae vere sunt perturbationes, et impotentiae: quod quasi iam 
animus sui non sit compos, sed in alienam potestatem reciderit, et caecitates, quod nihil despiciat. Nam 
primas illas, affectiones rectius dixeris: alteras, commotiones, seu concitationes, quae Graeci pathe 
nominant, quasi passiones, patitur enim animus universus illo velut ictu et agitatu. 
49 Erasmus, it may be pointed out, contending with Jerome, rejects the propassions as a valid way of 
interpreting Christ’s emotional agony at Gethsemane, and is happy to interpret the scene as Christ’s 
emotions (passiones) violently overwhelming his mind (vehementissime purturbarit mentem); see the De 
taedio Iesu at ASD V-1, 252 (CWE 70:56). 
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vehementiores.50 Melanchthon had also read Vives by the time he wrote the Liber de anima, but 
he takes the distinction between violent and calm passions from the rhetorical tradition and 
adapts it to different aspects of his understanding of the soul. The Liber de anima is a long and 
complex work, and Melanchthon painstakingly analyzes various aspects of the soul (including 
the emotions) from several angles, bringing together an impressive array of disciplines. It 
provides good examples of the kinds of nuances that may attend the distinction between violent 
and calm passions when employed in various contexts. Melanchthon mentions ethe and pathe 
explicitly, and also distinguishes between the emotions which “aid nature” (iuvant naturam) and 
those which disrupt or destroy it (destruunt naturam).51 Those which aid nature are joy, hope, 
and love, while those which are destructive of it are sadness, fear, anger, and hatred. These have 
physical correlates to motions surrounding the heart (which is the fons et sedes affectuum), and 
related to the nerves of the brain, causing delight on the one hand (e.g. in joy) and pain on the 
other (e.g. in sadness) depending on dilating and restricting blood-flow around the heart.52 
Vehement and mild emotions can also result from certain predispositions based on humoral 
balance for Melanchthon, who in this treatise is at pains to integrate Aristotle, Galen, the new 
Vesalian anatomy, and Christian theological notions concerning the soul and its affections.53  
In his discussion of the aspects of the will, Melanchthon says a few things relevant to our 
theme. He writes that there are, in the will, four sorts of movement: innate inclinations, actions, 
habits, and affections.54 Actions, or movements, are closely related to habitus, in that they are 
“enduring” (firmos impetus), and they might also be identified with virtue and vice. Emotions 
(adfectus ethe et pathe) are types of actions, but which are joined with a kind of pain or 
                                                     
50 Elementa rhetorices (CR 13, 454): Nam alii affectus sunt leniores, qui vocantur ethe, qui blandis verbis 
efferuntur, quae significationem humanitatis atque officii praebent… Alii sunt affectus vehementiores, 
qui dicuntur pathe. In hic utendum est atrocibus et tragicis verbis. 
51 CR 13, 126. 
52 CR 13, 126: Praeterea sensus fit acrior, quia subtiles nervi a cerebro deducti sunt in corpus cordis, qui 
addunt delectationem laeticiae, et acerrimos dolores tristiciae. 
53 See, e.g., CR 13, 82 ff. Aquinas had also discussed vehemence of emotionality in a humoral context 
(see ST II-II. Q155, 156). 
54 CR 13, 167. inclinationes innatae, actiones, habitus, et adfectu. 
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suffering (dolor) or some kind of pleasure or joy (laetitia). Some lasting emotions (adfectus 
durabiles) are very like habitus, but mixed with sadness (dolore) or joy (laetitia).55 As in the 
distinction made previously, they can “wound nature” or they can delight it.56 In these 
descriptions, we see Melanchthon’s adaptation of the distinction between ethe and pathe from 
rhetorical theory and put into the context of an analysis of the emotions per se, and especially as 
they are inhabited physiologically and even more specifically as they relate to the physical organ 
of the heart.  
The mid-sixteenth-century move from rhetoric to psychological accounts of calm and 
violent emotions has a lasting effect on treatises into the seventeenth century and beyond. The 
intimation that calm emotions are similar to the Stoic conception of propassiones, hinted at 
above in Vives’ account, is found explicitly in a prominent seventeenth-century English work on 
the passions, Edward Reynolds’ A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man 
(1640). Reynolds was the bishop of Norwich as well as a prominent preacher, but his treatise on 
the passions aims at philosophical or theological rather than rhetorical ends. In particular, he is 
at pains to illustrate that the strong Stoic position against the emotions is problematic from a 
Christian perspective, but at the same time he nevertheless retains the conception of the Stoic 
propassions as useful for adjudicating the permissibility of emotion in Christian ethics. 
Describing Christ as a model affective example, he writes: 
There is more honour, in the having Affections subdued, than in having none at all; the 
businesse of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be above them. And therefore 
our Saviour himselfe sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, sometimes 
desired, sometimes mourned and grieved but these were not Passions that violently and 
immoderately troubled him; His Reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, 
                                                     
55 CR 13, 167. 
56 CR 13, 168: Adfectus est motus cordis aut voluntatis, sequens cognitionem, prosequens aut fugiens 
obiecta, quae cum aut laedant naturam aut delectent, semper comitantur extremi motus, dolor laesa 
natura, vel suavitas seu laticia fovens naturam.  
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according to the rule of perfect, cleare, and undisturbed judgement. In which respect, the 
Passions of Christ are by Divines called rather Propassions, that is to say, Beginnings of 
Passions, then Passions themselves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due 
measure, nor transported the Mind to undecencie or excesse; but had both their rising 
and originall from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuance limited by 
Reason. 
While Reynolds’ attempt to rescue the passions by grounding the permissible (calm) ones in 
reason is ostensibly a Stoic move itself, he goes on to reject the Stoics explicitly, further making 
the distinction between the calm and violent passions, and making clear his preference for the 
ethical permissibility of the former over the latter: 
Those imputations therefore which Tully and Seneca, and other Stoical Philosophers, 
make against Passions, are but light and empty, when they call them diseases and 
perturbations of the Mind; which requireth in all its actions both health and serenity, a 
strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the 
distempers of Passion: For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthful 
or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for, what water more 
sweet than that of a Spring? or what more thick or loathsome, than that which standeth in 
a puddle, corrupting itself? As in the Winde or Seas (to which two, Passions are 
commonly compared) a middle temper between a quiet Calm and a violent Tempest, is 
most serviceable for the passage between countries; so the agitations of Passion, as long 
as they serve onely to drive forward, but not to drown Vertue. 
Like Vives, Reynolds has invoked the metaphor of a calm and violent storm on the ocean to 
describe the distinction between types of emotion, but he has gone further than the majority of 
rhetorical writers in their discussions of this distinction by unequivocally assigning a negative 
value to the violent passions. In describing the calm passions as more amenable to reason 
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(though certainly not an idea wholly foreign to our earlier writers), Reynolds anticipates Hume’s 
somewhat more nuanced account of a similar relationship.57  
 Only a year after Reynolds published his treatise in England, the Oratorian Jean-Francois 
Senault (1599-1672) published De l’Usage des Passions (Paris, 1641) across the Channel. In the 
fourth chapter of this rather lengthy work, entitled ‘Quelle est la plus violente des Passions des 
l’homme?’ (“Which is the most violent of all the passions of man?”), Senault takes a different 
tack. While Senault, like Reynolds (and like most Christian writers discussing the passions in 
the early modern period), distances himself outright from the Stoics at the beginning of his 
treatise, having dispatched with them there, he is in this chapter more interested in Plato and 
Aristotle than in Cicero or Seneca. In particular, Senault’s interest is, as the title suggests, in 
discussing which particular passions is the most violent of all, rather than in elaborating on a 
distinction between calm and violent passions, but the contents of the chapter are nonetheless 
worthy of a brief overview.  
“Plato hath left us in doubt,” he writes (and here we follow the 1671 English translation 
of Henry, Earl of Monmouth), “and sounding the Question to the bottom, he contents himself 
with saying, there are four passions which seem to surpass the rest in violence.” The four, 
according to Senault’s Plato, are sensual delight (la volupte, Voluptuousness), anger (la cholere, 
                                                     
57 James Fieser has noted that some elements of Reynolds' account anticipate Hume's. See “Hume's 
Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors,” in Hume Studies 13:1 (1992), 7. But see Amy 
Schnitter in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy §7, on Hume’s ‘reason as slave of the 
passions’: Hume is particularly concerned with analyzing our practical reasoning, our reasoning 
about how to act. Passions are the engine for all our deeds: without passions we would lack all 
motivation, all impulse or drive to act, or even to reason (practically or theoretically). This gives 
at least one sense in which “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (T II.3.3 
415). Hume also holds that the passions are not themselves directly subject to rational 
evaluation. In fact, it seems something of a category mistake to think that they could be either 
rational or irrational. Passions are impressions – strong and lively perceptions with a certain 
“feel” and a direction, or impulse. Reasoning, however, is a matter of connecting various ideas 
in order to come to a belief; it may apply to, or even form, the circumstances under which 





Choler), desire of honor (desir de l’honneur), and fear of death (la crainte de la mort). Plato, 
according to Senault, thinks that the first is the most violent: “The first is Voluptuousness 
(volupté), which belies its name, and which breathing forth nothing but sweetness, ceaseth not to 
be extream furious; and to fight against reason with more violence than doth grief or anguish.” 
Choler, which though Senault describes it as excessivement violente on account of that it is 
nothing other than a boiling of blood around the heart, nevertheless thinks that it is “more 
reasonable than Voluptuousness”: “for as Lions are sooner tamed than Fish, an angry man is 
sooner appeased, than a voluptuous man converted; and experience teaches us that of these two 
Passions the more mild is the less tractable.” In the end, at any rate, Senault demurs from 
following Plato and moves on to consider the Peripatetic position: “Though I have a noble 
esteem of Plato, and that his ravings seem more noble, and more heightened to me than 
Aristotles Discourses, yet cannot I side with him in this... For Voluptuousness is not so much a 
particular Passion, as it is the Spring-head of all those that give us any contentment, nor is it so 
violent, but that it may easily be repress’d by grief and anguish.” Sensual delight, then, does not 
count as a passion, but rather as an avenue by which passions take hold. This is of interest en 
passant especially in light of a comment made by Descartes, whose treatise on the passions of 
the soul is published after Senault’s (in 1649), and who—though he doesn’t often discuss the 
calmness and violence of emotions—writes that “passions of attraction and revulsion are usually 
more violent than the other kinds of love and hatred, because what enters the soul through the 
senses affects it more strongly than what is represented to it by its reason.” 
Anger (or ‘choler’), Senault notes, is often referred to by Aristotle as the most violent of 
the passions, but Senault is not as convinced that it is thereby the most dangerous: “Choler is 
indeed the more ardent, but it is not of durance. If it turn not into hatred, the effects thereof are 
not to be dreaded; ‘tis more sudden violence, and to express its nature, we must say, that it may 
well do an ill action, but it cannot conceive a mischievous design.” Senault ultimately dismisses 
the fear of death as “only belonging to the Vulgar,” presumably grounds enough for it not to be 
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counted among the most violent. Senault goes on to consider jealousy as the most violent (the 
opinion apparently of many philosophers), but concludes that because it consists of both love 
and hatred, and because two passions fighting against one another soften the blow, it must of 
necessity be calmer. In conclusion, he settles, with very little argument, on love as the most 
violent: “But since after having worsted a Falsehood a Truth must be established, let us say that 
according to our principles this question is not hard to resolve; for as we acknowledge but one 
passion, which is Love, and that all the rest are but effects of her producing, we are bound to 
confess, that they borrow all their efficacy from their Cause; and that they have no other 
violence than what is hers.” 
The question as to which of the passions is strongest is not posed explicitly in the Cour 
sainte, ou institution chrestienne des grands (“Holy Court”) by Senault’s Jesuit contemporary, 
Nicolas Caussin (1583-1651), sometime confessor to Louis XIII. And yet, to his description of 
no fewer than fourteen passions in as many “treatises” in the fourth tome (“Empire of Reason 
over the Passions”) of this frequently printed and translated work, Caussin adds a coda of 
“historical remarks on the four principal passions, which are like four demons afflicting the holy 
court” (emphasis ours). These “principal passions”, viz. love, desire, anger and envy, are singled 
out, then, for their powerful (negative) effects, as evinced in exemplary narrative, rather than 
their ontological status as primary or basic emotions – an index of the interpenetration of 
rhetorical and philosophical modes of thought and writing in this influential Jesuit moralist. 
 
Back to Brumoy: Strong and Weak ~ Short and Long ~ Real and Represented ~ Calm and 
Violent Passions 
The question of the strongest passion was raised directly by Caussin’s younger confrère, Pierre 
Brumoy, in his “Plaidoyer Pour la Paresse” (“Plea for Idleness”), a somewhat paradoxical 
appendix to the Latin poem, De motibus animi, with which we began this investigation. How, 
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then, does Brumoy understand the measure of strength in relation to that of mildness/violence of 
the passions?  In the introductory “Lettre a M*** Sur la question, sçavoir, De toutes les 
Passions laquelle est la plus forte,” Brumoy claims to have participated in a semi-academic 
debate on this topic some 18-19 years earlier. “Having excluded a number of both calm and 
violent passions that seemed unfit to enter into a competition for supreme power over the human 
heart,” Brumoy’s friends, he says, settled on three or four contenders for the title, arguing in turn 
for love of riches, love of honours, and love of pleasure. However, there was general agreement 
that: 
the Passion which prevails in the heart at a given moment is, at that moment, the 
strongest. Thus any Passion, even one that was very mild, could be assumed to be the 
strongest in this respect, and even more so, especially, if it was Vengeance, or any other 
violent emotion arising from a Hatred that dominated. But to remove any ambiguity, the 
question was simplified and reduced to determining which was most commonly, if not 
always, the strongest of the Passions. Now that was not Hatred, nor Vengeance, nor, 
moreover, Love or Friendship, or any other Passion of that kind. These have their limits. 
One does not hate nor love forever. It costs us too much to hate or love for a long time. 
The heart is exhausted – to its shame – even in friendship […] As for Vengeance, one 
takes revenge – it was added – almost always because of a point of honour. One doesn’t 
always hate, even though one takes revenge. One forgives at least from that moment 
when one is avenged. It’s rare that one feeds and lives on Vengeance.58  
If this debate is not an entirely fictional pretext, and took place nearly two decades before the 
publication of his didactic poem, Brumoy anticipates here Hume’s clarification of the different 
                                                     




ways in which a passion can be at once violent and weak, calm and strong. The duration of the 
passion, as in Hume, is key.59 
Moreover, in one of the three preliminary discourses to his most famous work, the 
Théâtre des grecs, first published in 1730, Brumoy had elaborated on these various distinctions 
(calm-violent, strong-weak, short-long) in the context of poetic and theatrical representations. In 
the “Discours sur l’origine de la Tragédie” (which we quote for convenience from the English 
translation of Charlotte Lennox), he observes that representations of the soft passions are more 
suited to epic than to dramatic poetry precisely because of their slow-burning nature:  
And the principal passions which Homer touches, are all of them conformable to the 
length of his poem, and to the nature of man, considered in the light of a reader. Joy, 
curiosity, admiration, and those soft passions, may bind the heart a long time without 
fatiguing it. On the other hand, terror, indignation, hatred, pity, and a number of other 
passions, whose vivacity may drain the very soul, are treated in the Iliad in a cursory 
manner, and always with subordination to the moderate passions which we see reigning 
throughout the poem. But in a play, which ought not to last a long time, the lively 
passions may perform their part; and though subaltern in a poem, they may command in 
a tragedy, without tiring the spectator, who would be apt to doze, were the actions too 
lingering. This way of reasoning is founded in everything else upon the real nature of 
passions. A man cannot sustain long a violent agitation. Anger has its transports. 
Revenge has its rage, but their last clamours are of small duration. If these sensations 
reside long in the heart, it is like fire stifled under embers. Their flame causes too great a 
conflagration to be durable. Desire, fright, pity, love, hatred itself, all of them, when 
carried to the greatest excess, exhaust themselves soon. The violence of a tempest, is the 
                                                     




presage of its end. The lively and the short passions, therefore, are the true proper 
motions to animate the theatre.60 
It is worth noting that the “soft” (“douces”) passions mentioned here (joy, curiosity and 
admiration) are not those so classified in Brumoy’s didactic poem, nor does the collocation of 
pity (“pitié”), fright (“effroi”), and hatred (“haine”) as highly flammable passions match their 
assignment in the poem to separate classes of mild and violent. Since there is reason to believe 
that the De motibus animi was composed in roughly the same period as the Théâtre des grecs, 
the tantalizing question remains whether Brumoy revised his conceptualization of the calm and 
violent distinction prior to publication of the poem – not to mention, whether he was aware of 
Hume’s Treatise.61 
 In the discourse on the origin of tragedy, however, Brumoy is most concerned to 
demonstrate that the passions represented in literature and on stage serve, as it were, to 
inoculate us against real-life passions through the vicarious experience of them. Pity and fear 
are said to be the most “dangerous” of these, but by the insinuation into man’s heart of “the 
agreeable and the soft parts” contained therein, he is rendered “more humane” and taught “how 
to moderate his passions, when more passions shall come to be excited by real misfortunes” 
(xl). Yet Brumoy’s characterization of the effects of real-life pity and fear might well lead us to 
believe that he considered them both, in some sense, “violent” passions: “An horrible monster 
would make us shiver with fear. A miserable wretch, whom we could not relieve, would tear 
our entrails” (xxxvii). Note that Brumoy nowhere enjoins a Stoic avoidance of passion. The 
experience of compassion, for example, is important for our moral life, and the (duly tempered) 
                                                     
60 The Greek Theatre of Father Brumoy Translated by Mrs Charlotte Lennox (London, 1759), 3 vols., 
vol. 1, pp. xxxv-vi. 
61 See Haskell, “Performing the Passions”, p. #. As Michel Malherbe has pointed out, the Jesuit 
Mémoires de Trévoux was “remarkably silent about Hume” and does not appear to have reviewed the 
THN (“Hume’s Reception in France”, The Reception of David Hume In Europe, ed. Peter Jones (London, 
Thoemmes Continuum: 2005), 43-97, at 80). There were, however, reviews in other French-language 
journals as early as 1739. 
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spectacle of the passions reminds us of our spiritual destiny: 
 
Indeed human life is a great theatre, where we are spectators of many evils of every kind: 
We feel upon that stage every day (besides indigence, grief, and death) raging desires, 
deceived hopes, despairing fears, and devouring cares. But all these representations only 
inspire a terror and a pity, more capable of lowering than strengthening the human heart. 
Let us say what we will, we are not comforted in our misery by the sight of miserable 
objects. Besides that every man takes as much care as he can to avoid a view of 
wretchedness, that he may enjoy the sweets of life with more tranquility, or that he may 
render himself pitiless and insensible of the miseries of his fellow creatures: forgetting 
that he is man, and so are every one of them: and that by long sorrow he must pay dearly 
for his short joys. (xxxix-xl) 
These Christian moral imperatives are absent, of course, from Hume’s account, and, as we 
have stated, it is not our intention in this essay to draw a direct line from the Jesuit humanist to 
the Scottish philosopher. Yet we believe that, in developing his theory of affects, Hume was by 
no means immune to aesthetic and literary discussions, and probably not only those mediated 
by his friend, Hutcheson. A trace of the long rhetorical tradition we have been excavating here 
may be glimpsed in Hume’s observation that ‘[t]he raptures of poetry and music frequently rise 
to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into 
so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible’ (THN. 2.1.1). Again, when he 
asserts that “[t]he same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, 
produces only a calm one” (THN 2.3.4), he comes close to the moral aesthetics of ‘passion at a 
distance’ expounded by Brumoy in his discourse on the origin of tragedy.62  
By way of an envoi rather than conclusion, Brumoy’s prescription of at least the “soft 
                                                     
62 The idea is also reminiscent of the proem to the second book of Lucretius’s De rerum natura, where 
the Epicurean philosopher, free from care, is compared to the man who watches sailors struggling at sea 
from the safety of the shore. The Lucretian passage is cited by Brumoy in this context. 
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parts” of the violent (qua unpleasant, combustible, entrail-tearing…) passions points us in 
interesting ways to the attention recently devoted by modern psychologists to the “positive 
side” of “negative” emotions.63 While the single most important dimension in modern 
psychological analyses of the emotions does, indeed, seem to be that of positive/negative, the 
meaning of this distinction has been mapped onto a variety of dichotomies including 
pleasant/unpleasant, approach/avoidance, functional/dysfunctional, and so on.64 Given its long 
history from antiquity through to the eighteenth century, we find it surprising that the one 
distinction not routinely invoked in these modern psychological taxonomies is that between the 





                                                     
63 The Positive Side of Negative Emotions, ed. W. Gerrod Parrot (New York: Guilford Press, 2014). 
64 Jerry Parrott has, however, drawn our attention to recent emotions models that invoke multiple 
dimensions, e.g. Phillip Shaver et al., “Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype 
Approach”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52.6 (1987): 1061-86 and Johnny R.J. 
Fontaine et al., “The World of Emotions is not Two-Dimensional,” Psychological Science 18.12 (2007): 
1050-57, arguing for classification positive-negative, potency (control), activation, and unpredictability. 
